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I will admit to needing little convincing, but “Are animals persons?” (Rowlands 2016) provided
new ways to understand how animals qualify for the status. Rowlands begins by sketching out
different ideas about personhood. He points out that it can refer to a legal sense, in which the
status of person is enshrined in law, or a moral sense, in which a person is “the sort of thing to
which a certain sort of moral consideration is owed.” His target article does not address these
ideas about personhood, but instead focuses on personhood in a metaphysical sense. This refers
to essential characteristics not encompassed by legal or moral conceptions of the person. One is
a person in the metaphysical sense by virtue of possessing those characteristics. As for what
these characteristics are, this is where Rowlands challenges existing assumptions. He explains
that debates about personhood have long relied on John Locke’s definition, in which a person is
“a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself the same
thinking thing, in different times and places.” In sum, personhood requires both the existence of
a mental life and the ability to recognize the contents of that life as part of the “same thinking
thing” that has or is the life (Rowlands 2016: 2). In other words, the thinking being must
recognize, as William James (1961) put it, “I am the same as I was yesterday … the Me of now
and the Me of then are continuous” (68).
A being’s ability to “consider itself” constitutes a form of self-awareness, a necessary condition
for personhood. Any being that is not self-aware is not a person. Most humans qualify as
persons in this sense, but debate about whether non-human animals also qualify persists. The
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inability of many species to recognize themselves in mirrors purportedly demonstrates that they
lack reflective self-awareness. In other words, they cannot have the thought that “the body in
the mirror is identical with me.” Rowlands works his way around to resolving this, but first, he
addresses the other part of Locke’s conception: a unified mental life. The sight of one’s image in
the mirror must be somehow grouped with thoughts and states also seen as “belonging to me.”
Seeing an object in the mirror and recognizing the object as oneself involves first-order
processes. Personhood based on reflective self-awareness also requires higher-order processes
that bind that recognition with other thoughts, perceptions, acts, and states together as
belonging to me. This involves meta-cognition, or the ability to think about thinking. In this view,
the thoughts, acts, and other processes belong together because of another thought that they
belong together. However, this higher order thought is a different kind of thought than the
others. According to Rowlands, we cannot answer the question of whether the various thoughts
belong together by adding another thought, for we cannot know whether this thought even
belongs with the others. We cannot explain the unity of thought by saying that it depends on
another level of thought. Unity of thought cannot come from a higher order thought “about”
the others, for the additional order undoes the unity.
Rowlands then suggests reconsidering what it means for a thinking being to “consider itself.” He
proposes that the form of self-awareness involved in this process may not necessarily rely on
higher-order meta-cognition. As an alternative, Rowlands makes a distinction between two
different meanings of awareness. In the first case, if I say that I am aware of a book on my desk,
the book’s presence on the desk is independent of my awareness of it. The book is on my desk
regardless of whether I am thinking about it. In the second case, if I say that I am in pain, the
pain is not independent of my awareness but is part of knowing the experience. The pain
doesn’t exist apart from my awareness of it. My awareness in the second case is pre-reflective,
built into the act of experiencing pain as pain. Knowing or experiencing something as something
is not separate from the knowing or experiencing. In this sense, when a thinking being
“considers itself,” the act of considering includes the awareness that the act is mine. The act
indicates self-awareness; the knowing or experiencing as can only occur for the subject who
knows or has the experiences. There is no additional step, no other level of thought required. In
this way, pre-reflective awareness provides the unified mental life necessary for personhood.
Evidence of pre-reflective awareness appears among animals; Rowlands uses the example of the
dog who experiences another dog as familiar. A unified mental life means that animals qualify as
persons.
From a sociological perspective, two areas of research can add to the discussion. First, in
addition to the legal, moral, and metaphysical senses, personhood is also a social
accomplishment. Situations, interactions, and relationship provide the setting for the
production of persons. The socially defined and publicly visible person can be teased apart from
individuals’ reflective awareness of themselves (see Cahill 1998). Across history, many human
groups have been denied the status, including Jews, African Americans, slaves, the intellectually
disabled, and prisoners, just to name a few. Granted, they have also been denied legal and
moral personhood, but the extent to which they have been deprived of the interactional
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resources that enable the “collaborative manufacture” of the person depends on social context
(Goffman 1967: 2).
Beginning in the 1990s, a body of sociological literature began to apply this perspective to
animals. Studies of interactions between caregivers and the mentally disabled (Pollner and
McDonald-Wikler 1985; Bogdan and Taylor 1989) provided the basis for this work. For instance, in
examining how family members assign personhood to the severely disabled, Bogdan and Taylor
(1989) found that caregivers attribute thinking to the disabled person, granting him or her abilities
to reason and understand. Non-disabled family members also consider the disabled person a
partner in interaction, with his or her gestures, body postures, and facial expressions accomplishing
what spoken language would otherwise have done. Family members also see the disabled as
having their own preferences, feelings, and other characteristics. Moreover, they incorporate the
disabled into household routines and rituals, and thus into the narrative history of the family. In
this way, social interaction also provides the material through which the disabled attain the status
of person.
Clinton Sanders (1993, 1999) extended this to show how dog owners extend the status to their
dogs. He found that owners saw their dogs as minded social actors who could act in ways that
shaped their owners’ definitions of situations. Owners also saw their dogs as individuals and could
easily describe what a particular dog “was like” (1993: 215). They saw their dogs as having a range
of emotions and demonstrating sensitivity to emotions in others. In addition, they incorporated
their dogs into household practices through mealtimes, opportunities for play and exercise, and
into family rituals such as birthdays and holidays. Similarly, Steven and Janet Alger (1997) observed
how cats took the role of the other, defined situations, chose courses of action, and demonstrated
memories of past events. These analyses offer a clear sense of the social construction of
personhood among animals through everyday interaction.
Second, my own research on selfhood among companion animals meshes nicely with
Rowlands’s discussion of pre-reflective awareness. As I understand it, this awareness presumes
a self, which is part of experiencing as. In sociology, the self has long been reserved for human
beings. This is our legacy from George Herbert Mead (1962), who declared spoken language as
the barrier between humans and non-humans because it enables us to understand and
communicate the symbols for self, such as our names and the names of other objects. Mead
recognized that animals communicate but claimed that their interaction involves an instinctual
“conversation of gestures,” such as when one dog growls at another who threatens to steal his
bone or a cat hisses at a rival. Mead considered the “conversation of gestures” insignificant
because it allegedly has only one meaning. The behavior of animals may be goal-directed, aimed at
getting food, a mate, or defending territory, but it lacks the negotiated meaning that humans
engage in through language. Because animals could not use language, Mead rendered them
incapable of having meaningful social interaction, and therefore, lacking the selfhood that would
emerge from that interaction.
Relying on language eliminates many aspects of interaction that contribute to selfhood. Moreover,
it restricts those who can possess selves to human beings. The flaws in Mead’s view are numerous,
3

Animal Sentience 2016.136: Irvine on Rowlands on Animal Personhood

and other scholars have reviewed them in detail (see Sanders and Arluke 1993; Myers 1998;
Sanders 1999). If we grant that factors beyond spoken language matter for the creation of the self,
then animals can participate in the process of self-making. To do so, they must themselves be
subjects. How can we sense their subjectivity? As with other people, we cannot observe it directly.
We perceive it during interaction. To illustrate how this takes place, I borrow ideas about the
manifestation of self that originated with William James (1961) and were later applied to infants
(see Stern 1985). Because infants lack the ability to use language, their experiences can be
compared to those of (at least some) animals, who have similar brain structures and musculature.
Whereas human development leads to language acquisition that adds to these basic experiences,
the experiences themselves are preverbal. They consist of:
(1) A sense of agency, meaning that you are the author of your actions and movements and
not the author of the actions and movements of others;
(2) A sense of coherence, meaning that you understand yourself as a physical whole that is
the locus of agency;
(3) A sense of affectivity, meaning that patterned qualities of feelings are associated with
other experiences of the self;
(4) A sense of self-history, meaning that you maintain some degree of continuity, even
while changing.
Human beings gain these experiences through interaction with others, beginning at birth. These
four experiences not only underlie one’s own senses of subjective experience, they also form the
basis for distinguishing self from other. Combined, these four preverbal experiences constitute a
“core” self (see Stern 1985: 71) around which additional senses of self accrue. I offer brief examples
of how these aspects of the core self manifest themselves among animals, drawing on my research
on dogs and cats and the literature on other animals (Irvine 2004a, 2004b, 2007).
Agency
Agency implies subjectivity, in that an agentic being, by definition, has desires, wishes, and
intentions, along with a sense of having those things. In other words, it is the actor’s awareness
of having desires or wishes that is an element of selfhood, not simply having them. Agency also
implies having control over one’s own actions (i.e., I can sit when I decide to, and if you push me
into a chair, that is a different experience) and awareness of the felt consequences of those
actions. For example, my intention to sit brings the felt consequence of sitting.
Several indicators of agency appear in the first months of life, as babies begin reaching for
objects and gaining hand-to-mouth skills. Infants around four months of age begin to use visual
information to shape the fingers to accommodate objects of particular sizes. Because agency
does not depend on language, it is feasible among other species. Some of the best examples of
animals’ agency come from the arena of dog training, even at the beginner’s level. As Sanders
(1999) explains, trainers teach dogs to exercise self-control. This implies that the dog recognizes
that he or she can initiate action, since in order to control one’s self one must first have a sense of
will or volition. In my research at an animal shelter, I saw frequent examples of this when staff
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members sought to make under-socialized dogs more adoptable. A typical case involved a young,
mixed-breed dog who jumped up on the gate of his kennel and barked wildly for attention
whenever anyone came near, making most potential adopters think twice. The key to modifying
the dog’s behavior was to change his understanding of the cause of the rewards he receives. A dog
who jumps up on his kennel and barks receives two kinds of rewards. To the extent that the
behavior is self-directed (i.e., aimed at releasing energy), it is constantly rewarding. However, to the
extent that the behavior is directed at others, as an attempt to gain their attention, there is only a
probabilistic chance of reward. As long as the reward of attention depends upon others, it will be
unpredictable. The dog does not control it. The only thing he controls (or should) is his behavior.
We had to make the dog understand how to increase the probability of rewards from others. To do
so, we removed him from the adoption area for a few days to reduce the foot traffic past his
kennel. We scheduled regular exercise to reduce his need for the jumping. Most importantly, we
stopped reinforcing his bad behavior. We paid attention to him only when he stood quietly. If he
got up on his hind legs or barked, we moved away from his kennel. Because he had released some
pent-up energy through exercise, the reward of attention became a higher priority. Moreover,
because attention depended on others, he soon learned to control himself to get it. This subtle act
of behavior modification helped the dog distinguish self from other by distinguishing different
reinforcement schedules. Infants develop this ability as early as three months of age; the same
probably holds for other highly social animals, with similar implications for discriminating self from
other.
Coherence
If agency provides a sense of self versus other then coherence provides the boundaries of the self.
Coherence gives agency somewhere to “live.” Several indicators of coherence are independent of
language, making them likely in non-human animals. According to the infancy research, the
capacity to recognize distinct others, such as primary care-givers, becomes available at two or three
months of age. Animals, too, can recognize distinct others. People who regularly work with certain
animals find that animals quickly begin to recognize them. More relevant for the discussion of
coherence is how animals understand that parts of people belong together. For example, during
my research, I had regular contact with a dog who required several surgeries. I often restrained him
while a technician drew blood and I sat with him as he woke up after his first surgery. When he
recovered and became available for adoption, other people also worked with him, but whenever
he saw me, he brightened up. One day, when an E-collar obscured his vision, I approached him
from behind as he stood next to two other people. As I passed, I greeted them. As I did, the dog’s
tail wagged and he turned as if to confirm that the physical form matched the familiar voice.
Although some might dismiss this as a conditioned response (i.e., my voice had been programmed
into his behavioral repertoire), another example is less easily dismissed. Animals demonstrate
coherence in the act of hiding, which requires a sense of self as an object to conceal from others.
Hiding “shows an awareness that the ‘embodied self’ is in danger and that concealment is in order”
(Sanders 1999: 137; see also Allen and Bekoff 1997). Cats, having evolved as skilled predators,
relied on the ability to hide in order to hunt. Janet and Steven Alger (2003) found that cats adapt
their hiding into games of hide-and-seek (58).
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Affectivity
Another dimension of the core self is the capacity for emotions, which not only indicate pleasure
and displeasure, but also connect the previous two self-experiences. If agency refers to experiences
of self as the initiator of actions, and coherence locates those actions within an embodied entity,
then affectivity refers to the ability not only to experience emotions but also to associate emotions
with the other aspects of self. Affectivity assigns “ownership” to an action and its associated
internal state. For instance, in face-to-face play involving mother and child, the child smiles or
makes a face and the mother reacts with laughter or mock surprise. The child, experiencing
pleasure at the mother’s response, repeats the gesture to elicit the same emotional experience.
Although the mother participates in the activities, the feeling “belongs” to the child. The research
on infant development has identified signs of this capacity between three and six months of age.
It is now widely accepted that animals experience emotions. Dogs and cats experience surprise,
contentment, fear, frustration, boredom, and joy, just to start the list. They form close bonds,
suggesting affection and perhaps even love. Other animals also experience emotions, and research
has grown steadily in recent decades. For example, orphaned elephants grieve and experience
post-traumatic stress (Bradshaw et al. 2005; Poole 1998) and ravens fall in love (Heinrich 1991).
Evidence suggests that animals can also associate feelings with distinct experiences and understand
that they are the source of the feelings, thus suggesting the constellation of agency, coherence,
and affectivity of a core self. For example, in 2012, a popular video showed a crow sledding on a jar
lid. The bird slid down a rooftop on the lid, dragged it back to the top, and went down a second
time before the close of the one-minute video. This exemplifies the solitary activity known as
object play. Most birds and mammals engage in it (Bekoff and Byers 1998), as do some reptiles,
such as turtles (Burghardt 1998), and even octopuses (Mather and Anderson 1999). Although we
cannot say how the bird labeled the experience, he or she clearly enjoyed it. Judging by the effort
taken to repeat it, the bird knew that he or she was the source of the experience.
Self-History
A sense of continuity, made possible by memory, completes the constellation of core selfexperiences. Memory preserves the meaning of events, objects, and others, and their associated
emotions. Memory begins to operate very early in life. Among infants, motor memory enables
them to learn to sit up and to suck a thumb, and perceptual and affective memory allows them to
recognize familiar faces or toys and to smile upon doing so. The memory required for self-history is
preverbal, and several aspects of it appear in animals. Anyone who has ever taken a dog or cat to
the veterinarian knows that animals remember places. Skeptics might say that the animal “just
smells fear,” dismissing the reaction as instinctual. However, even if it were “only” instinct,
consistently registering a particular emotion in a setting nevertheless implies a sense of continuity.
In addition to the veterinarian’s office, others have documented animals’ “place memory” (Lerman
1996; Sanders 1999; Alger and Alger 2003). Indeed, Kenneth Shapiro (1990, 1997) suggests that the
lives of dogs are oriented in terms of place, rather than time, as ours are. Feline examples abound
6
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in the work of Steven and Janet Alger (1997, 2003). In their research in the cat shelter, they
observed that the cats designated certain places such as cage tops and beds as “not just
comfortable places for sleeping, but also safe places to relax, to find intimacy with others, and to
explore their need for affection” (2003: 110). The sheltered cats learned to define these areas in
the same terms, suggesting a coherent system of memory created through symbolic interaction.
A behaviorist would characterize these examples not as memory, but as simple conditioned
responses. Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff (1997) make a distinction that is useful in this context. They
distinguish between behavior that is “stimulus bound,” meaning an invariable (or nearly so)
response to external stimuli, and behavior that is “stimulus free,” or motivated by internal factors
(56-62). When external factors predominate over internal factors, behaviorist explanations are
preferred. However, in many instances, behaviorist conclusions have been drawn from research
that ignores or disregards internal factors. For example, many laboratory studies of allegedly
stimulus-bound behaviors must modify conditions so that animals will be sufficiently motivated to
perform according to behaviorist expectations. This is especially the case in experiments involving
food rewards, in which researchers must keep animals motivated to eat even when internal
responses perceive satiation. In such cases, stimulus-bound conclusions are drawn from behaviors
that would under normal circumstances be stimulus free. To use an example closer to home, two
of my cats regularly sleep on a fleece blanket. It is not stretching the point to say that they find this
particular blanket comforting. This comfort has been to some degree conditioned. Nevertheless, if I
were to produce the same blanket during an examination at the veterinarian’s office, neither cat
would respond with kneading and napping. The behavioral explanation becomes inadequate in
contexts that involve various inputs. They require a more complex explanation, and the possibility
of memory seems a reasonable alternative.
At the end of his target article, Rowlands suggests, “instead of thinking of all the ways in which
animals might not be persons, or juggling with one’s conception of a person to ensure that
animals are disqualified, it might be more fruitful instead to think of the ways in which they are”
(16). Thinking about personhood in terms of collaborative manufacture, and the self in terms of the
capacities outlined here, responds to this suggestion. Extending person- and selfhood to animals
does not equate persons with humans. It leaves room to acknowledge that our experiences differ
from those of other animals in degree rather than kind. Humans develop selves that allow us to
accomplish interactions that animals cannot undertake — and vice versa. Non-human animals
develop the capacities that matter for their social lives. It would be as unfair to measure human
experience by a dog’s or an elephant’s capacities as it would be to measure canine or elephant
experience in human terms. Yet that is precisely what we have done in denying them personhood. I
applaud Rowlands for leveling the playing field to include all conscious beings.
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